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Abstract 
Security prices in efficient markets reflect all relevant 
information. Past price formations and even fundamental 
analysis cannot guarantee abnormal returns consistently to any 
pre-identified strategy or market participant, be they novice or 
expert traders. There have been various studies conducted with 
the aim to test market efficiency in emerging markets. However, 
in this study, we have surveyed the professional investment 
community and have studied their stated actions in making 
investments. Our results indicate the prevalence of herding and 
overconfidence in professional analysts. We also found that 
analysts extrapolate the past into future forecasts. We also 
discovered an association between demographic characteristics 
and the choice of security valuation methods that the analysts 
use. In line with Chevalier and Ellison (1998), we found that 
younger analysts herd less than the older ones. 
Keywords: Investment behaviour, behavioural finance, herding, 
mutual funds, security analysis, CAPM, technical analysis. 
JEL Classification: G02, G11, G12, G14 
Introduction 
Behavioral finance tries to explain the anomalous behaviour of 
security prices on the basis of psychological biases in human 
cognition and irregularities in human behavior. In behavioural 
investment, it is quite common that investors make mental accounts 
of the different motives for holding and using their money. This 
explains the paradoxical behavior of an investor who might be 
buying lottery with a specific amount and at the same time may put 
money in the forced savings plans with banks and peers without 
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earning any profit. Thus, investors might be risk-averse for a 
particular portion of their investible endowments and risk-neutral 
for another portion. This contrasts with the singular utility 
preferences in the mainstream portfolio theory. 
Furthermore, financial investments should be evaluated 
purely on the grounds of risk-return metrics, however, emotions like 
regret and loss aversion as well as cognitive shortcuts like framing 
and anchoring might influence investment decisions. There is also a 
tendency to hold losers too long and sell winners too soon among 
investors (Shefrin & Statman, 1985). 
On the other hand, if gender differences exist in investment 
behaviour, then the gender with high risk aversion would be offered 
safer investments as compared to the gender with less risk aversion 
(Schubert, Brown, Gysler & Brachinger, 1999). The behavioural 
finance literature provides some evidence that women are more risk 
averse and less overconfident than men (Bliss & Potter, 2002). Such 
gender differences may affect investment performance. 
Additionally, investors may process information differently based 
on their cognitive capacities and investment skills. Thus, rumours 
can make novice investors herd while seasoned analysts benefit 
from noise trading by avoiding mistimed investments. The 
investment horizon of institutional fund managers and individual 
investors may also be different and both of them may not act as 
ordinary shareholders (Suto & Toshino, 2005). This behavioural 
complexity shows that a uniform asset pricing model may not be 
suitable for all the different types of investors with different 
objectives, motives and characteritics. Finally, agency problems 
also have an influence on the investment behaviour of equity fund 
managers (Arnswald, 2001).  
Following is a brief list of various biases and behavioral 
irregularities established in empirical studies and experimental 
researches. 
1.1. Representativeness Heuristic 
In this phenomenon, people expect that recent information 
represents the key population parameters well enough. Therefore, 
people tend to give more weight to recent evidence over prior beliefs 
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and/or past data. The fallacy here is that representative data or 
observation may not necessarily be repeated in future. 
1.2. Herd Behaviour  
Herding refers to following the market consensus. It is not necessary 
that herding should be considered irrational. It is a rational response 
in the face of uncertainty and lopsided payoffs when deviation from 
the consensus is penalized more when it does not work than 
rewarded when it does. In the next section, we will report evidence 
from past studies that some fund managers, analysts and even 
CEO’s mimic each other. 
1.3. Disposition Effect  
As explained later in the prospect theory as well, investors tend to 
avoid the situation of having to bear actual irreversible losses. 
People tend to hold losing stocks too long and sell gaining stocks 
too early. People believe that until they sell the stock at a price less 
than the purchasing price, loss has not occurred. Hence, they wait 
for the price reversal on stocks that have gone down in value. But, 
investors tend to sell gaining stocks too early so as to book gains 
immediately. 
1.4. Anchoring 
Investors often put more emphasis and credence on recent market 
information including prices. People tend to extrapolate from recent 
trends without confirming that they may differ from historical, long-
term averages and probabilities. One form in which it is clearly 
visible in investors’ behaviour is that often people are willing to take 
more risk after they have made good earnings in the recent past. 
Contrarily, they take less risk after incurring losses in the recent past. 
In both cases, risk taking may vary even if the fundamentals and 
other information remain the same. 
1.5. Regret Theory 
Human beings cannot always detach their emotions from investment 
decision making. This theory explains the emotional reaction people 
experience after realizing their errors in decision making. People are 
sometimes emotionally attached to the price at which they have 
purchased the stock. Current market price and other information 
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may suggest that the past price is not a relevant basis for value 
securities. However, emotional attachment leads people to use it as 
an anchor. This results in behaviours like delay in selling at prices 
lesser than the purchase price so as to avoid the feeling of regret. 
1.6. Loss Aversion: Prospect Theory 
In loss aversion, the utility function is steeper for losses than for 
gains. This means that people experience more disutility from a loss 
than the positive utility experienced from an equal gain. According 
to Kahneman and Tversky (2013), this phenomenon is referred to as 
loss aversion. Kahneman and Tversky (2013) empirically estimated 
the difference between the utility and disutility of equal amounts of 
gain and loss and their estimates suggest that disutility from loss is 
a multiple of two and half times the sense of utility from an equal 
amount of gain. 
 
Figure 1. Utility of gain and loss 
It also leads to another exposition of this anomaly. The 
framing of choice by emphasizing gains more than losses or vice 
versa also tends to influence investment choices. Even though the 
information content in both cases could be exactly the same.  
2. Rationale for the Study 
If markets are efficient then current prices will reflect all the relevant 
information, either public or private. It implies that in an efficient 
market, it will be extremely difficult for any investor or any strategy 
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to consistently beat the market and gain excess returns over the 
market return.  
However, in the real world, mutual funds and investment 
advisors do exist and earn a handsome remuneration for their 
services. It is also observed that the average size of a mutual fund’s 
portfolio has increased in developed as well as developing countries. 
In Pakistan, for instance, despite there being almost no IPOs in the 
last couple of years, the size of the mutual funds industry has still 
grown.   
As far as the investment decision making in funds or by 
individuals is concerned, there have been many attempts made in the 
past studies to analyze the investor behaviour. Jensen (1968) 
analyzed 115 mutual funds for the years 1955-64 and concluded that 
fees and expenses take away any advantage that the portfolio 
managers might have.  
Even if investment management fees and loads are added 
back to performance measures and returns are measured at gross of 
management expenses, Jensen (1968) concluded that on average the 
funds apparently are not quite successful enough in their trading 
activities to cover even their brokerage expenses. 
It is also pertinent to study how soon the information is 
incorporated into price and whether that is balanced on average or 
result in over or under reaction. For instance, in 1987 stock market 
crashed in USA and 22.6% value of shares declined without any 
apparent news. Moreover, over the years, 50 largest one-day stock 
price movements occurred on days of no major announcements. It 
has been established empirically that the inclusion of stock in the 
S&P 500 index results in significant share price reactions.   
Overreaction causes past losers to become underpriced and 
past winners to become overpriced. Werner, De Bondt and Thaler 
(1985) studied two portfolios of 35 stocks. One portfolio comprised 
extreme winners over the past three years and the other portfolio 
comprised extreme losers over the past three years. It was found that 
the losers outperformed winners over the next four years. The losers 
were up 19.6% relative to the market, whereas the winners were 
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down 5% relative to the market. Hence, there was a difference of 
24.6% between the two portfolio returns. 
Odean’s (1999) study of overconfidence in the marketplace 
listed several important findings given below. 
 Frequent traders earn lesser returns as compared to less frequent 
traders. 
 Overconfident traders hold under-diversified riskier portfolios. 
 Overconfident insiders improve price quality. Hence, they 
exploit the information. 
 Overconfident noise traders worsen price quality. Hence, 
speculation leads to price irregularity. 
In some studies, it has also been discovered that age plays a 
role in risk taking. Younger and older fund managers behave 
differently because of career concerns. Younger fund managers do 
not tend to take on much risk and hence avoid being in an odd 
position. Hence, herd behaviour is not so uncommon among even 
the specialist investors (Chevalier & Ellison, 1999). 
In literature, three motives for herding have been 
prominently noted and observed, that is, information-based herding, 
reputation-based herding and compensation-based herding. 
Information-based herding occurs in situations when the analysts 
lack confidence in their private information. Reputation-based 
herding is explained by the career concerns of the analysts and it is 
more common among less experienced and younger analysts. 
Compensation-based herding is also influenced by career concerns. 
Since deviation from the market consensus is rewarded less when 
the analysts are right and penalized more when they are wrong, the 
younger and inexperienced analysts tend to herd more often.  
Cheng, Liu and Qian,(2006) studied weights assignment by 
money market fund managers on the forecast recommendation of 
Buy-Side-Analysts (BSAs) and Sell-Side-Analysts (SSA). They 
concluded that the optimal weight put on BSA’s research by fund 
management increases with the quality of their signals. According 
to them, the weight put on BSA’s research also increases when the 
quality of the SSA’s signal decreases. They also found that weight 
depended on the degree of bias. When the degree of bias increases 
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in SSA’s forecast, it also leads to an increase in optimal weight put 
on BSA’s forecasts. 
Brown, Wei and Wermers (2013) investigated the 
inclination of fund managers to herd, that is, to follow analysts’ 
recommendations. They also tried to explore whether the herding 
behaviour by fund managers had an impact on stock prices in turn.  
Discussing their findings, Brown et al. (2013) noted that 
mutual fund herding does have an influence on stock prices. In their 
study, it was found that mutual funds overreact when they engage in 
herding behaviour. Positive consensus recommendation revisions 
result in a herd of funds buying a stock, while negative revisions 
result in a herd of funds selling a stock. They also concluded that 
herding on recommendation changes is driven partly by career 
incentives.  
Elliot, Hodge and Jackson (2010) investigated the 
relationship between non-professional investors’ information 
choices and their portfolio returns. They found that less experienced 
non-professional investors earn lower returns as their use of 
unfiltered information increases relative to their use of filtered 
information.  
Contrarily, more experienced investors earn higher returns 
as their relative use of unfiltered information increases. Elliot et al 
(2008) interpreted the findings to suggest that the observed 
phenomenon is explained by investors’ ability to make effective use 
of unfiltered information. They concluded that the relative use of 
information (unfiltered or filtered) does not determine the returns 
for investors.  
Noting the effect of investing experience, the noted scholars 
suggested that less experienced investors are likely to remain unable 
to use unfiltered information. This is not the case with more 
experienced investors. Hence, investing experience affects the 
ability to make better use of unfiltered information which 
determines the return. Relative availability of information content is 
not a principal determinant of returns. 
Other than herding, some studies have explained other 
psychological factors that affect different analysts’ behaviour. For 
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instance, Chen and Jiang (2005) reasoned that overconfidence, 
which is boosted by the holding of private information, may result 
in deviation from consensus. 
In the current study conducted for Pakistan’s premier equity 
market, we try to analyze the investment decisions by professional 
investors. We attempt to analyze various links between 
demographic variables and the choice of security valuation methods. 
We also try to find the evidence for various behavioural finance 
concepts and hypotheses like herd behaviour and overconfidence. A 
similar study had been done for Pakistan by Qureshi, Rehman and 
Hunjra (2012) based on the responses collected from equity fund 
managers of insurance companies, commercial banks, and equity 
investment companies by applying stratified random sampling 
technique. The results of their study demonstrate that a positive and 
significant relationship exists among heuristics, use of financial 
tools, risk aversion, firm-level corporate governance, and 
investment decision making.  
3. Research Methodology 
Primary data is collected from 47 people who are professional 
analysts working in mutual funds, brokerage houses and investment 
companies. Data is collected through a structured questionnaire. 
Sample unit comprises individuals who are professionally working 
as financial analysts, fund managers, broker analysts, and research 
analysts in senior and junior positions. For sampling, a mix of 
convenience and snowball sampling method is used. For analysis of 
data, descriptive tools are used. Contingency tables used in the study 
also enable us to highlight possible relationships between different 
factors in the study.  
4. Data Analysis 
4.1. Profile of Respondents 
The mean age of the respondents is 29 years. The median age of 
respondents is 27 years. It shows that mostly young people are hired 
for the task of financial analysis who are usually better trained and 
equipped with numerical computations and use of modern day 
software to carry out financial numerical analysis.  
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We collected data about ‘marital status’ so that we can relate 
marital status with security valuation methods used and identify 
whether people with more family expenditure requirements tend to 
be radical or conservative in their forecasts. If they herd more, then, 
they are conservative forecasters. Table 1 gives the frequency 
distribution of this variable. 
Table 1 
Marital Status Profile of Respondents 
Marital Status Number of Respondents 
Married With Kids 15 
Married With No Kids 6 
Single 26 
Table 2 shows the profile of respondents by designation. It 
can be seen that the analysts chosen for the study in this sample are 
working in both senior/supervisory and junior positions. Table 2 
gives the frequency distribution of this variable. 
Table 2 
Designation Profile of Respondents 
Designation Number of Respondents 
Fund Manager 8 
Head of Research 4 
Stock Broker 4 
Senior Analyst 17 
Junior Analyst 14 
4.2. Analysis from Behavioural Finance Perspective 
To analyze the investment behaviour of analysts, we asked the 
analysts to forecast the market movement in the third quarter of 
2013, that is, July 2013 to September 2013. Table 3 reports the 
results. 
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Table 3 
Forecast for KSE for 3QCY13 
Forecast (% 
Change) 
Frequency Percent Cumulative 
Percent 
-10 3 6.52 6.52 
-5 3 6.52 13.04 
0 7 15.22 28.26 
5 19 41.20 69.57 
10 14 30.43 100.00 
Total 46 100.00  
The average result of their forecasts is 4.13% computed as 
group mean. Hence, on average, professional analysts think that 
market will rise by 4.13% during Jul-Sep, 2013. It can be seen from 
Table 4 that the bullish past influences the future expectations. 
Market return in excess of 10% in 1QCY2013 and 2QCY2013 
influence the investors to carry the bullish sentiments forward in 
3QCY13. 
Table 4 
Past Returns in KSE for CY 2013 
Date Close Value Return 
2-Jan-13 17,242.74  
1-Feb-13 18,173.67 5.40% 
1-Mar-13 18,043.31 -0.72% 
1-Apr-13 18,982.42 5.20% 
2-May-13 21,823.05 14.96% 
3-Jun-13 21,005.69 -3.75% 
1-Jul-13 21,363.16 1.70% 
Average Monthly Return  3.80% 
Average Overall Return 23.90% 
1QCY2013 Return 10.09% 
2QCY2013 Return 12.54% 
About marital status and herding, it can be seen from Table 
5 that 80% of unmarried analysts do not follow market consensus as 
compared to 40% of married analysts with no kids and 60% of 
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married analysts with kids. This shows that possibly single people 
are less conservative and more ambitious in their financial valuation.  
Table 5 
Marital Status and Herding 
Market 
Consensus 
Marital Status 
Total Married 
with Kids 
Married 
with no 
Kids 
Single 
0 9 3 21 33 
1 6 3 5 14 
Total 15 6 26 47 
It is possibly due to the following reasons; 
a. Career concern. Their forecast error will be heavily penalized 
than the errors made by experienced forecasters. Still, for the 
sake of career growth and to stand out, they take the risk.   
b. Few opportunities to switch jobs in the initial phase of their 
career. Hence, they want to advance with a performance that 
stands out. 
c. Coming from the academia, they have the inclination to use tools 
that may not be used generally by existing analysts. Hence, their 
forecast may differ from others and they may have more 
confidence and credence in their numerical capabilities to 
understand the workings of capital markets and frictions. 
d. No past forecasting success in a career which could act as a 
cushion if they make errors. 
To investigate the relationship between age and herding, we 
categorize analysts here as young and old. Analysts less than 30 
years old are considered young and analysts more than 30 years of 
age are considered old. It can be seen from table 6 that 75% of the 
young analysts do not follow market consensus as compared to 55% 
of old ones. This further reinforces the above findings. 
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Table 6 
Age Group and Herding 
Market 
Consensus 
Age Group 
Total 
Young Old 
0 26 7 33 
1 9 5 14 
Total 35 11 47 
Nonetheless, when we test the association between herding 
and characteristics like age, income, designation, appraisal 
frequency and education by using non-parametric tests, such as 
Pearson’s Chi-square, likelihood-ratio Chi-square, Goodman and 
Kruskal’s Gamma, Kendall’s Tau and Cramer’s V, we find that 
there is no association between the tendency to herd and these 
characteristics.  
However, we find that there is an association between 
herding and marital status which implies that single analysts at a 
young age and with minimal experience relatively herd less than 
married analysts who are older, more conservative and well-
connected in their professional networks to receive tips from peers. 
Furthermore, this is further substantiated by the positive evidence 
we found for the association between herding and experience. Older 
analysts with much better connections within the analyst community 
and with finance managers in the real sector corporations are better 
able to make a judgement about market consensus and hence use it 
in their favour. On the other hand, younger analysts may have less 
information about the market and hence they tend to depend more 
on their skills rather than the asymmetric and private information 
prevailing in the market. Finally, higher risk taking may be 
explained by a higher degree of overconfidence, less herding 
behaviour, or a lower degree of risk aversion (Menkhoff, Schmidt 
& Brozynski, 2006).  
In Table 7, we depict the confidence ratio of the analysts and 
we observe that analysts are overconfident and this result is 
consistent with earlier studies as well. People tend to be 
overconfident about their abilities, trade more than necessary, and 
create noise and volatility in the market which is capitalized by other 
investors and hence abnormal returns do tend to occur with some 
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strategies and to some participants. It can be seen from table 7 that 
less than 5% people have rated themselves below average. More 
than one-third of analysts in the sample have rated themselves above 
average. 
Table 7 
Self-Rating by Respondents 
Self-Rating Frequency Percent Cumulative 
Percent 
Above 
Average 
28 059.57 059.57 
Average 16 034.04 093.62 
Below 
Average 
03 006.38 100.00 
Total 47 100.00  
When we test the association between self-rating and 
characteristics like experience, designation, appraisal frequency, 
marital status and education by using Pearson’s Chi-square, 
likelihood-ratio Chi-square, Goodman and Kruskal’s Gamma, 
Kendall’s Tau and Cramer’s V, we find that there is no association 
between the tendency to overrate one’s ability and these 
characteristics as per the non-parametric tests.  
However, when we test the association between self-rating 
and income, we find that both are associated. High-income analysts 
tend to rate themselves highly as compared to low-income analysts. 
Thus, it shows that past performance leading to higher compensation 
makes the analyst more confident about their skills and abilities. On 
the other hand, analysts who have yet to advance in their careers and 
are earning lower incomes at the moment tend to have less 
confidence in their abilities to predict and time the market better than 
the average analyst. We also find that there is an association between 
age group and self-rating. Since age correlates with experience and 
income, it implies that with time analysts gain more confidence. 
Furthermore, past accomplishments make them advance in their 
careers and it further boosts their self-confidence. 
Table 8 shows that promotion within the financial analysis 
industry is not necessarily a function of experience. While junior 
Shaikh, S. A.    65 
                     Volume 1 Issue 1; February 2019 
analysts take time to progress, not all analysts who have spent the 
same amount of time in the profession go up the ladder necessarily. 
This is also substantiated a bit by the fact that the correlation 
between income and experience is 0.38.   
Table 8 
Experience by Designation 
Designation Mean Experience 
Fund Manager 7.09 
Head of Research 8.75 
Stock Broker 9.75 
Senior Analyst 7.61 
Junior Analyst 3.01 
Table 9 shows the appraisal frequency. It can be seen that 
there is a tendency in some organizations to conduct appraisal more 
frequently as compared to others. Mostly, performance appraisal is 
conducted on an annual basis. 
Table 9 
Appraisal Frequency 
Experience Mean Experience 
Monthly 8 
Quarterly 6 
Half Yearly 3 
Annually 30 
Table 10 shows the relative frequency with which different 
valuation methods are used by the analysts. We categorize their 
choices on the bases of their educational background.  
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Table 10 
Security Valuation Methods Used by Education 
Education 
/ Methods 
CAPM 
(%) 
MFM 
(%) 
DDM 
(%) 
TA  
(%) 
SFM 
(%) 
TS 
(%) 
MC 
(%) 
Local 
Graduate 
47.1 35.3 58.8 35.29 17.7 5.88 17.7 
Local 
Masters 
47.1 23.5 52.9 29.4 11.8 5.9 35.3 
Foreign 
Graduate 
50.0 50.0 50.0 100 50.0 100 50.0 
Foreign 
Masters 
50.0 100 50.0 100 100 100 50.0 
ACCA 50.0 100 50.0 100 50.0 100 50.0 
CFA 71.4 28.60 100.0 42.9 42.9 14.3 26.6 
Note: CAPM - Capital Asset Pricing Models, MFM- Multi-Factor Models, DDM - Dividend Discount 
Models, TA - Technical Analysis, SFM - Simulated Financial Models, TS - Time Series Tools, MC - 
Capital Asset Pricing Model. 
Table 11 shows the relative frequency with which different 
valuation methods are used. It can be seen that DDM is used most 
frequently, followed by CAPM, technical analysis and market 
consensus. 
It is interesting to note that one-third of respondents in the 
sample use technical analysis; hence, they do not believe that weak 
form efficiency strictly holds for Pakistan’s premier equity market. 
Hence, they believe that past price formations provide useful 
information and can be used to earn excess returns. We also find that 
almost one-third of the respondents tend to follow market 
consensus. Since few large block trades historically have moved 
stock prices away from fundamental values, analysts do not want to 
deviate too much from the market consensus. Time series tools are 
used by only 3 out of 47 respondents. It may very well be because 
of the lack of relevant skill set since most business schools and 
curriculum of professional certifications do not provide a rigorous 
training for using these tools. It also points towards the fact that 
economics schools need to fill this gap as they alone train their 
students in econometric techniques. 
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Table 11 
Security Valuation Methods 
Valuation Method Number of 
Respondents 
Percent (%) 
CAPM 24 51.1 
Multi-Factor 
Models 
12 27.7 
Dividend Discount 
Models 
29 61.7 
Technical Analysis 16 34.0 
Simulated Financial 
Models 
10 21.3 
Time Series 3 06.4 
Market Consensus 14 29.8 
5. Conclusion 
In this study, we have analyzed the investment decisions made by 
professional investors. We have attempted to analyze various links 
between demographic variables and the choice of security valuation 
methods. We have also strived to find evidence for various 
behavioural finance concepts and hypotheses like herd behavior and 
overconfidence, for instance. Our results indicate the prevalence of 
herding and overconfidence. We also found that analysts extrapolate 
past into the future forecasts. We also discovered an association 
between demographic characteristics and the choice of security 
valuation methods. Finally, we found that younger analysts herd less 
than the older ones. 
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